This paper examines whether only children have poor vision by exploiting the quasinatural experiment generated by the Chinese One-Child Policy. The results suggest that being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage points. We further investigate the mechanisms through which being an only child affects the myopia and find that only children, as the only hope in a household, receive higher expectations in terms of academic performance and future educational attainment and pressure to succeed in life from parents, which contribute to the increased myopia. We also find that the school quality of only children is significantly higher than that of non-only children. This study provides new insights into an important health consequence of One-Child Policy in China.
| INTRODUCTION
The quantity-quality model of Becker and Lewis (1973) suggests that decreases in the quantity of children will induce more resources to be allocated to each child so that the average child quality will increase. A large number of empirical studies have found a significant trade-off between the number of children and child quality, in terms of educational attainment and health, in China (Li, Zhang, & Zhu, 2008; Liu, 2014; Rosenzweig & Zhang, 2009 ). However, recently, a few studies have investigated the undesirable consequences of being an only child. For instance, they find that only children are less trusting, less trustworthy, more risk-averse, less competitive, more pessimistic, and less conscientious (Cameron, Erkal, Gangadharan, & Meng, 2013) . Only children are more depressed and less happy (Park & Wu, 2016) and have higher probability of being overweight or obese (Zhang, Xu, & Liu, 2016) . In this paper, we focus on another important health consequence of being an only child, that is, shortsightedness or myopia. Specifically, this paper relates the rising prevalence of myopia and the growing number of only children induced by One-Child Policy, providing new insights into an important health consequence of One-Child Policy in China.
Myopia, known as shortsightedness, causes difficulty in seeing distant objects. The costs of myopia are considerable. First of all, myopia is associated with substantial direct out-of-pocket expenditure (Zheng et al., 2013) . Moreover, poor vision negatively affects the academic performance and mental health of students (Glewwe, Park, & Zhao, 2016; Yi et al., 2015) , and it may further affect adult productivity. Myopia is common in school-aged children, particularly in Asia. China is one of the countries with the highest myopia rate in the world, which poses a major health problem. More importantly, myopia has risen dramatically in China recently. As shown by the National Survey on the Constitution and Health of Chinese Students, the prevalence of myopia in junior high school students increased by more than 25 percentage points over the last two decades, from 41.42% in 1995 to 67.33% in 2010 (see Figure 1) . A large number of studies have attempted to investigate the driving forces of the epidemic. For example, Morgan, Kyoko, and Saw (2012) find that the rising prevalence of myopia is associated with increasing educational pressures, combined with lifestyle changes, which have reduced the time children spend outside. The lack of exposure to bright light outdoors most often causes myopia. However, the causes of the rising educational pressures have not been investigated yet in the literature. In this paper, we examine whether the One-Child Policy initiated in 1980 in China is responsible for the increasing educational pressures and thus the rising prevalence of myopia in China.
Both genetic and environmental factors contribute to the development of myopia. Ethnicity plays a role in the occurrence of vision problems. Asian, Hispanic children are found to have higher prevalence of myopia than black and white children (Rudnicka, Owen, Nightingale, Cook, & Whincup, 2010) . Moreover, children with myopic parents are at higher risk of developing higher degree of myopia than those with no parental myopia (Lim et al., 2014) . The environmental factors implicated in myopia include near work, outdoor activities, and nutrition. For instance, near work, such as close reading distance and continuous reading, increases the odds of having myopia (Ip et al., 2008) . Time spent outdoors is associated with a decreased risk of myopia (Guo et al., 2013; Rose et al., 2008; Sherwin et al., 2012) , due to the protective effects of bright light. Diet and nutrition are also environmental determinants of myopia and myopic progression. A recent study by Lim et al. (2010) finds that higher saturated fat and cholesterol are correlated with higher risk of myopia. Among these risk factors of myopia, genetic factors do not explain the rising prevalence of myopia in China from the 1990s, as gene pools just do not change in two generations. The increased computer use may lead to increased myopia. However, a number of studies have examined the effect of computer use on myopia and found no significant correlation (Mutti & Zadnik, 1996; Rose et al., 2008) . There is clear evidence that a high and increasing prevalence of myopia in East Asia is driven by increasing educational pressures and urbanization (Morgan et al., 2012) .
In this paper, we exploit the quasinatural experiment generated by One-Child Policy in China to identify the causal effect of being an only child on the odds of having myopia. We find that being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by approximately 9.1 percentage points and the positive only-child effect is not due to the birth order effect. As shown by the Population Census data in China, the share of only children among junior high school students increased from 5% in 1990 to 42.7% in 2005. This implies that the growing share of only children leads to a 3.43 percentage points increase in the incidence of myopia during this period, which explains approximately 15% of the total increase in the prevalence of myopia in China.
We further examine the potential mechanisms through which being an only child affects myopia. We find that only children, as the only hope in a household, receive higher expectations from parents in terms of academic performance and future educational attainment, which contribute to the increased myopia. The findings are consistent with the evidence found in the literature, that is, only children receive more attention from parents as well as higher expectations and pressure to succeed in life (Roberts & Blanton, 2001) . We also find that the school quality of only children is significantly higher than that of non-only children. In order to better understand the mechanisms, we further investigate the impact of being an only child on time allocation of students. However, we find no significant difference in time   FIGURE 1 The prevalence of myopia of junior high school students in China: 1995-2010.
Source: The National Survey on the Constitution and Health of Chinese Students 1995 Students , 2000 Students , 2005 Students , and 2010 allocation between only children and non-only children. Finally, we find that the expectations of parents, school quality, and time spent on school-assigned homework significantly contribute to the myopia. After controlling for parental expectations, school quality, and time allocation, the impact of being an only child on myopia becomes insignificant.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, the prevalence of myopia has markedly increased within the past two decades in China. This is the first study that relates the rising prevalence of myopia and the growing number of only children induced by One-Child Policy. Second, this paper exploits the quasinatural experiment generated by the OneChild Policy in China to identify the causal effect of being an only child on the odds of having myopia.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 reports the empirical results and discusses potential channels through which being an only child affects the odds of having myopia. Section 5 concludes.
| EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
To examine the impact of single child on myopia, we estimate the following regression:
where Myopia i is a dummy variable that equals one if the student is shortsighted. Single i is an indicator for being an only child, and the coefficient of interest would be β 1 . X i is a vector of student characteristics, including gender, age, age squared, ethnicity, grade, hukou type, local resident dummy, and a dummy indicating whether the student had any serious disease before primary school. H i refers to parental and household characteristics, including parental educational level, party membership, occupation type, household economic condition, whether the household receives Dibao subsidy, the presence of sick or disabled household members who need long-term care, the access to tap water, and the use of improved sanitation facilities. 1 For the occupation type, we use a dummy variable indicating whether parents have professional occupations. More specifically, we define professional occupation as government official, general and senior manager in enterprises, and senior professional (including doctor, professor, lawyer, and engineer) and define nonprofessional occupation as skilled worker (including craftsman and driver), unskilled worker, service worker, self-employed, farmer, and unemployed. Household economic condition, which measures household income, comes from responses to the following survey question: "How's your family's current economic condition?" Responses were on a 5-point scale, ranging from very poor to very rich. In Equation (1), we control for dummies of economic condition. To control for observable and unobservable characteristics of a county/district, we also include county/district dummies D c in the regression. ε i is the error term. If being a single child is exogenous, the effect of single child can be estimated consistently by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, the number of children in a household is determined by parents. Parents who value quality (e.g., education and health) may prefer an only child. Moreover, parental preference for child quality might affect children's likelihood of being myopic. On the one hand, parents who value education may impose higher educational pressures on their only children. Due to the higher educational pressure induced by parental preference, these only children tend to work hard and have intensive near work, such as close reading distance and continuous reading, which increases the odds of having myopia (Ip et al., 2008 ). Thus, only child and myopia may both be the consequences of parental preference for child quality. On the other hand, parents who value quality may also concern over health of their children. Thus, they tend to provide sufficient nutrition and suitable studying environment to their children, which may reduce the odds of having myopia. Parental preference is the unobserved variable, which is associated with both only-child indicator and myopia. Consequently, OLS estimator may suffer from the omitted variable bias. In other words, the coefficient on Single i in Equation (1) would pick up not only the effect of being a single child but also the effect of any omitted family background variables, for example, parental preference for child quality.
In this paper, we use the exogenous imposition of the One-Child Policy to identify the causal impact of being an only child, net of family background effects. The One-Child Policy was initiated in 1980. At the early stage of the implementation of the One-Child Policy, the second birth was strictly forbidden. Because of the gendercide caused by the strict One-Child Policy, in 1984, the central government relaxed the strict One-Child Policy and allowed rural couples to have a second child if the first child was a girl, which is referred to as 1.5-child policy.
2 In China, most parents have a very strong desire to have at least one son. As rural couples can have a second birth if the first birth was a girl, they do not use sex-selective abortion for their first pregnancies but tend to use sex-selective abortion to ensure a boy in the second pregnancy. Despite the overall imbalanced sex ratio in China, the sex ratio of the first birth is quite normal and the gender of the first child could be viewed as exogenous (Chen, Li, & Meng, 2013; Ebenstein, 2010 Ebenstein, , 2011 . Table 1 reports the sex ratio at birth in China by birth order during 1995-2000 based on the 0.1% sample of the 2000 Population Census data. The sex ratio of the first-born child is 106.44 and 105.55 in urban and rural areas, respectively, which is around the natural sex ratio across world populations. The results in Table 1 indicate that parents may not engage in sex selection for their first birth, and the gender of the first-born child tends to be exogenous to the myopia rates. Moreover, the 1.5-child policy in rural China implies that families tend to have a second child if the first-born child is a girl. Thus, the gender of the first-born child can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) for single child. Additionally, the enforcement of the One-Child Policy varies across regions and across years. We can measure the strength of the enforcement of the One-Child Policy by using the average monetary penalty rate for one unauthorized birth in the provincial-level panel from 1980 to 2000 from Ebenstein (2010) . 3 The fine rates are formulated in years of household income (Ebenstein, 2010; Huang, Lei, & Zhao, 2016; Huang & Zhou, 2015) . Figure A1 plots the fertility penalty from 1980 to 2000 in each province, suggesting that fine rates in different provinces follow different patterns, both in terms of timing and magnitude. The geographical and temporal variances of fine rates help us identify the effects of the One-Child Policy in the empirical analysis. Because a pregnancy usually lasts for 9 months, parents' decision to have a child, if any, should be made close to a year in advance. We therefore match the CEPS data with the policy fine (at provincial level) 1 year before the birth year of students. The fine rates 1 year before the birth year should be exogenous to the myopia rate. The gender of the first-born child and lagged fine rates in the corresponding province and year can act as instruments for single-child indicator, which can be illustrated as the following regression:
3 | DATA We use data from the China Education Panel Survey (CEPS) conducted by National Survey Research Center at Renmin University of China. 4 The CEPS is a national, representative, longitudinal survey of junior high school students in China. The baseline survey was conducted in the 2013-2014 school year starting with two cohorts-the 7th and 9th graders. The CEPS applies a stratified, multistage sampling design with probability proportional to size, randomly selecting a school-based, nationally representative sample of approximately 20,000 students in 438 classrooms of 112 
| Definition of myopia
The definition of myopia comes from students' responses to the following survey question "Are you nearsighted?" The answers to this question include (1) Yes, I know the degree of myopia; (2) Yes, but I do not know the degree of myopia; and (3) No. If the answer to this equation is (1), then the student is required to report the degree of myopia in both eyes. We define that a student is nearsighted if his or her answer to this question is "Yes" no matter whether he or she knows the degree of myopia or not. So the myopia status in this paper is self-reported.
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Due to the nature of the data set, we cannot observe the true value Myopia * i , but an observable measure Myopia i , which is self-reported by students. We define
where e is the measurement error, partly depending on whether a student has had an eye examination recently. Consequently, the equation that we can estimate is
If only children tend to have eye examinations and, thus, are more likely to report having myopia, measurement error bias may arise. Nevertheless, if whether a student has had an eye examination recently is not significantly associated with the gender of the first-born child and fine rates, which are instrumental variables for single-child indicator, the estimates using IV approach are consistent. The results in Table A1 confirm that the indicator whether a student has had an eye examination recently is not significantly associated with the gender of the first-born child and fines rates. Table 2 shows the prevalence of myopia in junior high school students in China based on the CEPS survey. Fifty-nine percent of the junior high school students are shortsighted; however, only approximately 50% of myopic students know their degree of myopia. 6 The myopia rates are increasing with the years of schooling, from 53% for the 7th graders to 5 As most students in China have routine physical examination every year, including eye examination, normally, students know their myopia status.
| Myopia in China
More specifically, the CEPS shows that approximately 80% of students have eye examinations. 6 The percentage of myopic students who know their degree of myopia is comparable with the percentage of myopic students who wear glasses found 66% for the 9th graders. Interestingly, the incidence of myopia is higher for only children, that is, 66% for only children, compared with 54% for children with one or more siblings. Additionally, students in urban areas and girls are more likely to be shortsighted.
| Summary statistics
The characteristics of only children and children with one or more siblings (non-only children) are reported in Table 3 . As expected, only children are more likely to come from households with a first-born boy. Only children tend to be boy, younger, and to have urban hukou. Parents of only children tend to be more educated, to be party members, to have professional occupations, and to be richer. We also find that only children and non-only children have different time use patterns. Only children tend to sleep less and spend significantly more time on homework assigned either by teachers or by parents, extracurricular classes, but less time on watching TV. Specifically, non-only children spend approximately 2.5 hr per day on homework, including those assigned both by parents and by teachers, whereas only children spend 3 hr per day on homework, both of which are substantially higher than the maximum hours, that is, 1.5 hr, set by the Ministry of Education in China in 2008. Parents have significantly higher long-term expectation on only children in terms of future educational attainment. The school quality of only children is significantly higher than that of non-only children. 4 | RESULTS Table 4 presents the effect of single child on myopia applying both OLS and IV estimation strategy. The results of OLS estimation suggest that being an only child has a significantly positive effect on the odds of having myopia. Specifically, compared with students who have one or more siblings, being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by 2.6 percentage points. As previously discussed, OLS estimate may be biased because only child is largely a choice of parents.
| Baseline results
Parents who value quality may prefer an only child. Thus, the coefficient of single child may also pick up the effect of omitted family background variables. In order to address the potential endogeneity issue, we apply the gender of the first-born child and one-year lagged provincial fine rates as instrumental variables for the only-child indicator. As expected, if the first-born child is a boy, the incidence of being an only child increases by 22 percentage points; if provincial fine rates, formulated in years of household income, increase by 1, the probability of being an only child increases by 2 percentage points. The IV estimates in Column (3) show that being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage points, which is substantially larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate, which is shown in Column (4) of Table 4 . As discussed in Section 2, the OLS estimator can be biased downwards or upwards. The results in Column (4) suggest that the downward bias tends to dominate the upward bias. Finally, various tests, such as underidentification test, weak identification test, and overidentification test, all suggest that these two IVs are valid. For both OLS and IV results, the coefficients of other control variables are consistent and as expected. The significantly negative coefficient of boy dummy implies that girls are more likely to be myopic than boys, which is consistent with the existing findings in the literature (e.g., Fan et al., 2004; Rudnicka et al., 2016, among others) . One possible explanation would be that girls tend to spend more time on homework, reading, and other near-work activities, whereas boys spend more time on outdoor activities (Lu et al., 2009 ). The subsequent increase in near work predisposes girls to myopia development. Compared with the 7th graders, the 9th graders are approximately 13 percentage points more likely to have myopia problems. Interestingly, after controlling for the grade dummy, age has no significant effect on the incidence of myopia, implying that study load other than age matters for being myopic.
Family backgrounds also play roles in shaping children's myopia status. We consistently find that fathers with professional occupations significantly increase the incidence of myopia of their children. Nevertheless, the educational level of parents does not have significant effects on the likelihood of myopia. Students from households that receive Dibao subsidy are less likely to be myopic. Moreover, after controlling for Dibao subsidy dummy, family economic status does not significantly influence the incidence of myopia.
The baseline results suggest that the vision impact of One-Child Policy is remarkable: Being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by 9.1 percentage points. A number of studies find that the undesirable consequences of OneChild Policy on other health outcomes are also sizeable. For example, Zhang et al. (2016) find that being an only child increases the probability of being overweight by 9 percentage points. Park and Wu (2016) show that being an only child increases one's depression by 0.59 standard deviations and decreases one's happiness by 0.56 standard deviations.
| The degree of myopia
In Section 4.1, we apply an indicator, that is, myopia status, to measure nearsightedness. However, in the survey, students who are nearsighted and know their degree of myopia are required to report the degree of myopia in both eyes.
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In this section, we apply the information on the degree of nearsightedness to investigate whether being an only child affects the level of myopia.
To this end, we follow Cline, Hofstetter, and Griffin (1997) and classify myopia by diopter or degree as follows: 1 = normal or emmetropic (0); 2 = mild nearsightedness (−0.25 to −3.00 diopters); 3 = moderate nearsightedness (−3.00 to −6.00 diopters); and 4 = severe nearsightedness (−6.00 diopters or higher). 8 We analyze the effect of being an only child on the degree of myopia with an IV-ordered probit model. The marginal effects from the IV-ordered probit model are reported in Table 5 , suggesting that only child tends to have worse vision in both left and right eyes. 7 In the sample, approximately 50% of students who are nearsighted do not know the exact degree of myopia. Having information on the degree of myopia tends to be related with only-child status, as only children who are nearsighted are more likely to wear glasses and thus have their eyeglasses prescriptions. This is the major concern of self-reported degree of myopia. Nevertheless, myopia status, whose measurement error is less likely to be correlated with only-child status, is less problematic. Thus, our main results rely on the self-reported myopia status.
8 Students who did not report their degree of myopia are considered to be emmetropia. Note. The coefficients are the marginal effects from instrumental variable-ordered probit models. Only-child indicator is instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rates. All regressions include both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
| Robustness checks
The significant and positive effect of only children on the odds of myopia found in Section 4.1 may be simply due to the birth order effect. An only child is the first-born child in a household. A number of studies show that first-born children are more likely to be myopic than their younger siblings, because first-born children receive more attention from their parents in terms of their education (Guggenheim & Williams, 2015; Morgan & Cotch, 2013) . We test the robustness of our results by controlling for birth order in Equation (1).
In Column (1) of Table 6 , we first control for the number of siblings in the regression and find that it reduces the incidence of myopia, though statistically insignificant. In Column (2), to capture the nonlinear effects of the number of siblings, we use dummies of the number of siblings rather than a continuous variable. Nevertheless, as we do not have enough instruments for the dummies, we can only apply OLS estimation here. The coefficients of dummies show that the negative effect of the number of siblings becomes greater as the number increases. In Column (3), we only control for the birth order of students and find a negative effect of birth order on the incidence of myopia, though statistically insignificant.
In order to disentangle the effect of the number of siblings and birth order effect, in Column (4) of Table 6 , we control for both the number of siblings and dummies for birth order. Given the number of siblings in a household, which is instrumented with the gender of the first-born child and one-year lagged provincial fine rates, the birth order of a child is exogenous. We find a significantly negative effect of the number of siblings on the incidence of myopia after controlling for the birth order effect. This implies that, given the same birth order, the presence of an extra sibling reduces the incidence of myopia. For example, the coefficient of the number of siblings reflects the difference in the odds of myopia between first-born child without siblings (i.e., only child) and first-born child with siblings (i.e., non-only child). Therefore, we confirm that the positive one-child effect is not due to birth order effect. Additionally, the coefficients of dummies for birth order indicate that middle child has the highest incidence of myopia.
| Heterogeneous effects
To better understand the consequence of being an only child on myopia, we further investigate whether the effect of being an only child on the incidence of myopia differs across subgroups in our data. To this end, we divide the sample by gender, grade, and household economic condition. The results are reported in Table 7 . Note that the statistical test of differences in coefficients across groups reveals that there is no significant heterogeneity in the only-child impacts. Thus, the results in Table 7 should be interpreted with caution. Note. The reference group of the number of siblings in Column (2) is single child. The reference group of birth order in Column (4) is the first born. The number of siblings in Columns (1) and (4) is instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rate. The birth order in Column (3) is also instrumented with the gender of the first birth and provincial fine rates. All regressions include both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses. IV = instrumental variable; OLS = ordinary least squares.
Because of son preference in China, the only-child effects may be larger for boys. However, the estimates for girls and boys in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 indicate no significant difference in one-child effects across gender.
The impact of single child may be greater for the 9th graders due to the longer exposure to higher educational pressure. We report the results for the 7th graders and 9th graders separately in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 and find that one-child effect is significant and stronger only for the 7th graders whereas there is no significant effect for the 9th graders. Although only children do not have a significantly higher incidence of myopia in the 9th grade, they are probably at higher risk of developing higher degree of myopia as only children became myopic at an earlier age. Table A2 suggests that being an only child is significantly associated with greater risk of having severe nearsightedness (−6.00 diopters or higher) for the 9th graders. However, the relationship is insignificant for the 7th graders.
Parents with different socioeconomic status may place different expectations on their children. For example, parents in poor families may emphasize the role of education as a mean of alleviating poverty and thus have higher expectation on only children. We next examine whether one-child impacts on myopia are stronger for students from poor families. As shown in the last column of Table 7 , only children have higher incidence of myopia in poor families. However, the impact of being an only child on the incidence of myopia is insignificant for students from families whose economic conditions are medium or above (see Column (5) in Table 7 ).
| Channels
The exogenous decline in fertility induced by the One-Child Policy in China forces parents to place "all their eggs in one basket" with only children. Only children, who are the only hope in a household, receive more attention and resources from their parents. Accordingly, they also receive higher expectations and pressures from parents to succeed in life. Thus, only children tend to work hard and are more likely to be myopic. In order to test the above mechanisms, we consider two dimensions of expectations, that is, parents' short-term expectations on children's relative ranking of test scores in the class and parents' long-term expectations on children's future educational attainment. For the short-term expectation, students are asked whether their parents have specific requirements on their academic performance measured by their relative ranking of test scores. With regard to the long-term expectation, students are asked which educational attainment their parents hope that they will achieve in the future, for example, high school, college, or master. Note that both the short-term and long-term expectations of parents are reported by students, as it is the perceived parental expectation that influences the behavior of students.
In order to deal with the endogeneity issue, we apply IV-ordered probit model for two categorical expectation measures. Only-child indicator is instrumented with the gender of the first-born child and provincial fine rates. The first two columns in Table 8 present the impacts of single child on both parents' short-and long-term expectations. We find that parents hold significantly higher expectations if they have an only child. This suggests that the effects of single child on myopia could go through the channel by raising expectations of parents having an only child. In addition, we find that not only children's characteristics but also parents' features matter for parental expectations.
Parents who place higher expectations on their only children may also choose higher school quality for their children. The last column in Table 8 presents the impact of single child on the choice of school quality. School quality is measured by the relative ranking of junior high schools in a county/district. As above, we apply an IV-ordered probit model here. We find that parents of single child tend to choose high-quality schools. Because school quality is determined by performance- Note. All regressions are estimated using instrumental variables and include both individual and household characteristics (coefficient estimates not reported). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
based evaluation, the only child who is more likely to be in high-quality schools will bear heavy study load and exert more study effort, thus in turn increases the likelihood of having myopia problems. Additionally, we also find that the characteristics of students, parents, and family economic conditions affect the choices of schools. Better educated parents and parents with professional occupations tend to choose higher school quality for their children. As discussed above, the higher incidence of myopia for only children may go through higher expectations from parents by raising students' study effort. Therefore, we further test whether the only child has different time allocation from non-only child. We also apply both the gender of the first-born child and fine rates as IVs for single-child indicator to address the endogeneity issue. Table 9 presents the impact of the only child on time allocation in both weekdays and weekends. We find no significant difference in time allocation between only children and non-only children in both weekdays and weekends. 9 The insignificant impacts of single child on time allocation are probably due to the substantial measurement errors in time use data reported by students. In the time use survey of CEPS, students were asked to recall how they spent their time on various activities in the last week. It requires respondents to perform two difficult tasks: to recall their activities in the last week and to carry out an appropriate form of averaging. The recall error and the inappropriate form of averaging might lead to substantial measurement error. Finally, we test whether parental expectations, choices of schools, and students' time allocation contribute to the increased myopia. To this end, we control for parental expectations, choices of schools, and students' time allocation in the myopia regression in Table 10 . We find that the effect of only child on myopia is captured by newly added controls. Higher parental expectations and school quality are significantly associated with higher incidence of myopia. More school-assigned homework and internet surfing increase the likelihood of having myopia problems. This further 9 One exception is that only children tend to spend significantly less time on doing homework assigned by parents in weekends. supports our argued mechanism that the One-Child Policy effect on myopia is mainly through parental expectations and students' study effort.
| CONCLUSION
The traditional quantity-quality trade-off model implies that only children receive more resources and thus have higher educational attainment and health. In this paper, we show that only children also receive higher expectations and pressures from parents to succeed in life, which induces a high incidence of myopia. This paper relates the growing number of only children induced by One-Child Policy and the rising prevalence of myopia, providing new insights into an important health consequence of One-Child Policy in China. We exploit the quasinatural experiment generated by One-Child Policy in China to identify the causal effect of being an only child on the odds of myopia. We find that being an only child increases the incidence of myopia by approximately 9 percentage points.
We further examine the potential mechanisms through which being an only child affects the incidence of myopia. We find that only children, as the only hope in a household, receive higher expectations from parents in terms of academic performance and future educational attainment, which contribute to the increased myopia. We also find significantly higher school quality of only children, as one of the consequences of higher parental expectation. However, only children do not have significantly different time allocation to various activities. Moreover, we find that the expectations of parents, school quality, and time spent on teacher-assigned homework significantly contribute to the myopia. Note. The dependent variable is an indicator of having severe nearsightedness (−6.00 diopters or higher). Only the 7th graders report whether they wear glasses or not. The regressions are thus based on the sample of the 7th graders. All regressions include both individual and household characteristics. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
